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INTRODUCTION: STORIES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE AND STORIES  
IN OUR LIVES AND WORK AS PULPIT RABBIS 
In 2012, we confronted on both personal and communal levels the relation-
ship between law and stories. On November 6, 2012, Massachusetts voted on 
the “Death with Dignity” ballot initiative (Question #2).1 According to the text 
of the proposition, the measure would have allowed for a terminally ill patient 
to be given lethal drugs. Although the initiative was defeated, the topic generat-
ed significant debate both within political and religious spheres. More particu-
larly, there was a division within the Jewish community as to how to resolve 
the complex ethical and legal issues in relation to the ballot initiative. 
Orthodox Jewish interpretations of Jewish law suggested an opposition to 
the initiative. We, and our colleagues at Temple Israel, however, arrived at a 
different conclusion. As we have learned about civil procedure through this 
process, the first document in the equity petition is a story. In this paper, we 
will explore an early story (BT Ketubot 104a) and its pertinence to end-of-life 
decisionmaking; how this story has been read through the Jewish interpretive 
approaches known as Halakhic Formalism and Covenantal Ethics; and will 
comment on parallels that we perceive between Halakhic Formalism, Covenan-
tal Ethics, and Rule and Discretion. Through researching and writing this paper, 
we discovered a convergence of processes in civil procedure and the place of 
the narrative in Jewish decisionmaking. Just as narratives play an important 
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role in civil procedure, so, too, stories play a considerable role in Jewish deci-
sionmaking. 
I. COVENANTAL ETHICS AND HALAKHIC FORMALISM 
Rabbi David Ellenson, a leading Reform Jewish thinker, suggests that is-
sues surrounding medical ethics and the Jewish legal tradition need to be un-
derstood in light of two principles: (1) Halakhic Formalism and (2) Covenantal 
Ethics.2 
Halakhic Formalism, as defined by Ellenson, is the classical, traditional, 
text-based method for deriving resolution for all ethical issues: “This classical 
mode of doing Jewish ethics seeks to identify precedents from the rich litera-
ture of rabbinic Judaism in order to extrapolate principles and norms that would 
yield authentic Jewish prescriptions on specific issues.”3 Proponents of Hala-
khic Formalism are united by an approach to reading and interpreting relevant 
sources. This method of resolving complex ethical questions, however, trans-
cends Jewish denominational categories: Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and 
Reconstructionist. Although Halakhic authorities might read the same texts and 
employ the same methods, their conclusions and decisions may at times be sub-
tly and strongly at odds. Halakhic Formalism frequently leads to lively debate 
within the Jewish community. Crucially, in Halakhic Formalism, “[i]ndividual 
autonomy is not prized.”4 
Thus, every Jew is not empowered to decide for himself a course of action 
based upon his own reading of a text or legal tradition. Although there is great 
concern for the individual, the suffering of the person, and compassion for each 
human life at the center of a moral dilemma, in this methodology, the ultimate 
arbiter is a skilled, learned Jewish moral authority. 
The Covenantal Ethics approach was first articulated by Rabbi Irving 
Greenberg, a prominent Orthodox leader in the United States.5 Ellenson pro-
vides a clear and helpful definition of this methodology: 
This approach is marked by the dialectical, personal model of relationship be-
tween God and humanity found in the Bible. It affirms the belief that “human-
kind is created so as to be God’s partner in completing creation.” This means 
that God’s covenant with Israel does not restrict human freedom, but presuppos-
es it.6 
Like Halakhic Formalism this methodology transcends all Jewish denomi-
national categories. Fundamentally, it asserts that neither God nor the individu-
                                                        
2  See David H. Ellenson, How to Draw Guidance from a Heritage: Jewish Approaches to 
Mortal Choices, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHICS AND MORALITY 129 (Elliot N. Dorff & 
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3  Id. at 130. 
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al possesses a greater authority than the other regarding a moral decision. This 
assertion of individual autonomy is an irreconcilable difference and a radical 
departure from Halakhic Formalism. As Ellenson explains: 
Rabbi Greenberg argues that the dialectical interplay between “power and part-
nership” that is the mark of the relationship between God and humanity in the 
Bible provides the proper model for Jewish medical ethics as well. This means, 
in part, that people are empowered to become more and more like God. They are 
charged by God with responsibility for their lives and given permission to seek 
mastery and control over their environment. If someone asks, “What are the lim-
its?” Rabbi Greenberg contends the covenantal response “is that the limit is non-
existent.”7 
Finally, Greenberg “desires to assert an ethic of power, an ethic of human 
beings charged with responsibility and control for their own decisions.”8 This 
means that great emphasis is now placed upon the individual and deep regard is 
assigned for individual autonomy. Such autonomy suggests “not only that peo-
ple frame actions and rules for their own lives in concert with the tradition, it 
also involves an affirmation of the person’s right to act upon that determina-
tion.”9 In sum, the Covenantal Ethical model places partnership at the center 
point, which gives each human being the responsibility to exert personal auton-
omy in decisionmaking that controls his/her personal destiny. 
II. COMPARISONS BETWEEN HALAKHIC FORMALISM, COVENANTAL  
ETHIC AND COMMON LAW AND EQUITY 
It is interesting to consider Halakhic Formalism and Covenantal Ethics and 
parallels to the relationship between common law and equity; or, in contempo-
rary terms, rule and discretion. Admittedly, our understanding of common law 
and equity/rule and discretion is limited. However, based on what we have read 
of Subrin’s work, we find some basis for comparison. As Subrin has argued for 
twenty-five years, law and equity “need each other.”10 This is also true for Ha-
lakhic Formalism and Covenantal Ethics. 
A. Predictability and Flexibility 
Writing of the evolution of common law and equity in England, Subrin 
states: “Common law was the more confining, rigid, and predictable system; 
equity was more flexible, discretionary, and individualized. . . . The equity ap-
proach distinctly differed from the writ-dominated system.”11 
                                                        
7  Id. at 137. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  Interview with Stephen N. Subrin (on file with author). 
11  See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 920 (1987). 
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In Halakhic Formalism, the judge, or the rabbi, infers the legal standard 
applicable to a particular situation from a body of accepted authoritative texts: 
The Hebrew Bible and Babylonian Talmud have a statutory status in the Jewish 
legal system.12 As with common law, in Halakhic Formalism one plumbs the 
depths of Jewish law and “discovers there the resources to resolve a perplexing 
moral issue.”13 
B. The Development of Equity and Covenantal Ethics 
We also take note of Subrin’s statement, “Equity grew interstitially, to fill 
in the gaps of substantive common law.”14 Covenantal Ethics has emerged as a 
methodology to respond to contemporary issues that cannot be fully resolved 
through reading rabbinic texts that could not have anticipated, in the case of 
Physician-Assisted Death, advancements in medical technology and patient 
care. Just as Equity grew interstitially, so too Covenantal Ethics developed to 
fill the gaps when the application of Talmudic law was insufficient to respond 
to contemporary issues. 
C. Who Is the Judge? 
Subrin also writes, “[t]he equity approach distinctly differed from the writ-
dominated system. Judges were given more power by being released from con-
finement to a single writ, a single form of action.”15 Covenantal Ethics empha-
sizes each individual’s autonomy. When making legal decisions concerning the 
course of their lives, each individual is “the judge.” However, in Halakhic 
Formalism, the judge is, first, a rabbinic legal authority. Second, Halakhic 
Formalism, is, like common law, similarly “writ-dominated.” The judge in Ha-
lakhic Formalism is much more bound by written precedent than the “judge” of 
Covenantal Ethics. 
We recognize that in modern American jurisprudence what had begun with 
two courts and two judges in England (common law and equity) has been 
merged into one court with one judge. That single judge makes decisions based 
on rule and discretion. But this is analogous to the role of the judge in both Ha-
lakhic Formalism and Covenantal Ethics: whether the judge is a rabbinic au-
thority or an individual Jew, both make legal decisions by balancing rule and 
discretion in order to reach an ethical decision. 
III. THE STORY: BABYLONIAN TALMUD KETUBOT 104A 
Having outlined Halakhic Formalism, Covenantal Ethics, and general par-
allels between Equity and Common Law, we are now ready to turn to the perti-
                                                        
12  See Ellenson, supra note 2. 
13  Id. at 131. 
14  See Subrin, supra note 11. 
15  Id. 
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nent narrative found in BT Ketubot 104a. In the textual tradition of Judaism we 
do not encounter the concept of Physician-Assisted Death. Rather, in a limited 
number of sources, rabbinic discussion addresses the dilemma of how to pre-
serve human dignity in the face of impending death while balancing the belief 
that human life is given by God and in turn, God determines when an individu-
al is to die.16 
The principal texts that comprise the basis of Jewish law regarding these 
issues are: BT Avodah Zarah 18a; BT Ketubot 104a; Semaۊot 1:1–4; Yalqut 
Shimoni to the Book of Proverbs 943 (a medieval—twelfth to thirteenth centu-
ries—collection of midrashic commentary on the entire Hebrew Bible); 
Shulhan Arukh; Yoreh Deah, 339; Mapah, Rabbi Moses Isserles. These issues 
are not addressed in the Bible. As we will investigate, much of the rabbinic ex-
ploration of these complicated moral concerns is pursued through narratives ra-
ther than through legal exegesis. 
A. Our Rendition of BT Ketubot 104a 
On the day when Rabbi died, the rabbis decreed a public fast and offered 
prayers for heavenly mercy. Rabbi’s handmaid ascended the roof and prayed: 
“The immortals desire Rabbi [to join them] and the mortals desire Rabbi [to 
remain with them]; may it be the will [of God] that the mortals may overpower 
the immortals.” When, however, she saw how often he resorted to the privy, 
painfully taking off his tefillin and putting them on again, she prayed: “May it 
be the will [of the Almighty] that the immortals may overpower the mortals.” 
As the Rabbis incessantly continued their prayers for [heavenly] mercy she 
took up a jar and threw it down from the roof to the ground. [For a moment] 
they ceased praying and the soul of Rabbi departed. 
B. Analysis of the Story 
BT Ketubot 104a and BT Avodah Zarah 18a are the earliest discussions of 
the issues at hand found within rabbinic literature. Importantly, the “Rabbi” in 
this text refers to Judah ha-Nasi (2nd–3rd CE) the principal editor of the Mish-
nah, the earliest of codification of rabbinic Judaism (220 CE).17 Thus, the main 
character in this short episode is a pivotal leader in early Judaism. 
Of equivalent importance, at least to our minds, the central protagonist in 
this story is an unnamed woman (Rabbi’s Handmaid) who is acknowledged in 
                                                        
16  For instance, 1 Samuel 2:6: The LORD deals death and gives life, Casts down into Sheol 
and raises up. Or, Job 1:21: He said, “Naked came I out of my mother’s womb, and naked 
shall I return there; the LORD has given, and the LORD has taken away; blessed be the 
name of the LORD.” And, Psalm 36:10: “With You is the Source of life; by Your light do 
we see light.” 
17  See Judah ha-Nasi: Jewish Scholar, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/biography/Judah-ha-Nasi (last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
1484 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1479 
rabbinic tradition as a person of sagacity.18 Furthermore, as P.J. Hurwitz writes, 
“[t]his Talmudic story is told without any criticism, and we may draw the con-
clusion that the Maid’s action was silently approved or at least tolerated.”19 
Against the backdrop of a rabbinically declared public fast and the offering 
of prayers, the story unfolds in three acts. First, it begins with the Handmaid 
ascending to the rooftop where she offers a prayer. In act two, from the vantage 
point of the roof, the Handmaid observes Judah ha-Nasi frequently and painful-
ly using the outhouse. In response to what she witnesses, she changes her pray-
er. In the third act, it is as if a camera zooms out to show the rabbis engaged in 
their ceaseless prayer to extend Rabbi’s life, while Rabbi’s Handmaid is poised 
with a jar in her hand standing on the rooftop. She then hurls the jar to the 
ground, interrupting the rabbis’ prayers. At that moment, Judah ha-Nasi dies. 
As with many well-written short stories, the brevity of the narrative masks 
a series of interwoven narrative elements that, when revealed, lead read-
ers/interpreters into considerations of multiple layers of meaning. 
C. Element 1: Spatial Relations 
Although the writers do not emphasize the physical location of the charac-
ters in the story, spatial relationships do convey meaning. Therefore, the 
placement of these characters—Handmaid on the roof, rabbis down below—
contains implicit meaning. Roofs of buildings are, in other rabbinic stories, lo-
cations of prayer during times of adversity.20 In this story we take note of two 
exceptions to this leitmotif: the first is that our story concerns a woman praying 
on a roof, and second, that the Handmaid not only prays in that location but al-
so drops a vessel from the roof. We will further investigate this action by a fe-
male protagonist below.21 
We also emphasize the Handmaid’s perspective both literally and figura-
tively. She is capable of seeing more, and therefore knows more than the (male) 
rabbis are capable of seeing or knowing since they are clustered together pray-
ing at ground level. Because of her vantage point, she has insight as to Rabbi’s 
suffering. Her observations affect the content of her prayer and subsequently 
her actions. We also note that the character in our story who sees the most and 
knows the most is a woman. 
One thing she knows is an earlier detail about Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi’s ill-
ness. We read in BT Ketubot 103b (and continuing onto BT Ketubot 104a) that 
Rabbi was “living in Beit Shearim. When he fell ill, he was moved to Sepphoris 
                                                        
18  See BT Mo’ed Qatan 17a; PT Shvi’it 9:a p.38; BT Megillah 18a; BT Shabbat 152a; BT 
Ketubot 104a. 
19  See P.J. Hurwitz, Sources from Talmud and Mishnah on Dilemma’s End-of-Life Care, 61 
CCAR J.: REFORM JEWISH Q. 142 (2014). 
20  See OFRA MEIR, RABBI JUDAH THE PATRIARCH: PALESTINIAN AND BABYLONIAN PORTRAIT 
OF A LEADER 331 n.69 (1999). 
21  See infra Part IV. 
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because it was situated on higher ground and the air was temperate.”22 In the 
geography of Israel, Beit Shearim is located in the Valley of Jezre’el (which in 
English means, “God sows”). Today it is a large fertile plain in central Israel. 
As the narrative describes, Sepphoris (938 feet above sea level)23 is at a higher 
altitude than Beit Shearim (450 feet above sea level).24 Here too, the location of 
the events conveys meaning. In Hebrew, Sepphoris is called Tzipori, which 
may be translated as “a bird, perched on a hill.”25 The Handmaid’s vantage 
point is, as it were, “on high”: in a town already perched on a hill, she watches 
from an even higher altitude, on the roof of a house. All of these elements con-
tribute to the sense that the Handmaid stands alone, towering over the drama 
unfolding below like a keen-eyed bird. 
The Handmaid also knows the reasons for moving Judah ha-Nasi from a 
valley to the hill country, reasons that we, as readers, now know too: the air in 
Tzippori was considered salubrious. In search of a remedy to Judah ha-Nasi’s 
illness, he “takes the air” a common approach to curing illness that continued 
well into the nineteenth century. 
D. Element #2: Public and Private Realms 
Our story begins with a description of public activity: the decree of com-
munal fasting and prayer. The narrative then quickly turns to the events within 
one household, thereby juxtaposing public and private activity. Typically, rab-
binic narrative is laconic. Narratives contain only the most important details 
pertinent to a writer’s message: every detail matters. Therefore, the fact that we 
are given little information about the unfolding public activity but a plethora of 
detail about what occurs in the private realm indicates that the private activity 
is at the epicenter of this story in terms of meaning and structure. 
From her vantage point, the Handmaid witnesses “how often [Rabbi] re-
sorted to the privy, painfully taking off his tefillin, and putting them on again.” 
Based on the detail of going to the privy (which was located outside of the 
house thereby enabling the Handmaid to witness, from above, Rabbi’s travail), 
rabbinic commentators diagnosed Judah’s illness as an acute and painful diar-
rhea.26 
It is the next detail—regarding Rabbi’s tefillin—that enters into the consid-
eration of the reader, what we label, in contemporary terms, quality of life is-
                                                        
22  See MARCUS JASTROW, DICTIONARY OF THE TARGUMIM, THE TALMUD BABLI AND 
YERUSHALMI, AND THE MIDRASHIC LITERATURE 178 (1926). 
23  See Sepphoris, PROJECT GUTENBERG SELF-PUBLISHING PRESS, 
http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/sepphoris (last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
24  See Israel Sites—Beit Shearim, MAKƿM, http://makomisrael.org/blog/israel-sites-beit-
shearim/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
25  See BT Megillah 6a; BT Ketubot 104a. 
26  Rashi BT Ketubot 104a explicitly states, “He (Rabbi) suffered from diarrhea (choli 
b’me’ai-im).” In BT Baba Metzia 85a, Rabbi’s bowel disease is descriptive rather than ex-
plicit. 
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sues. In present day Judaism, traditionally observant, male Jews don tefillin as 
a component of their morning prayer. There is evidence, however, that in the 
rabbinic period (third to seventh century CE), some men wore tefillin through-
out the day.27 The wearing of tefillin for Judah ha-Nasi symbolizes the routine 
of daily living. What the Handmaid witnesses is how Rabbi’s illness disrupts 
his routines, and the phrase “painfully taking off his tefillin, and putting them 
on again” reflects the further deterioration of his quality of life. 
E. Element #3: Prayer and Action 
We also take note of the function of prayer and its relationship to the end-
of-life issues explored in BT Ketubot 104a. In our story, prayer is a mechanism 
for maintaining the life of Rabbi. Prayer too, is used, by the Handmaid, first to 
pray for his recovery, but then, in a second prayer, to ask for his death.28 Addi-
tionally, we track the relationship between the Handmaid’s prayers and the sub-
sequent action of hurling the vessel from the roof. First, she prays that Rabbi 
will live. Time passes, and seeing that his suffering is not alleviated, the Hand-
maid tries a different tactic: she offers a prayer seeking Rabbi’s death.29 When 
this second prayer does not prove efficacious—perhaps concluding that the 
prayers of Rabbi’s disciples are countermanding her own—the Handmaid uti-
lizes a different remedy for alleviating Rabbi’s suffering: she hurls the vessel 
from the roof thereby interrupting the others’ prayers and assisting in Rabbi’s 
death. As we explore below, the prayers and actions of the Handmaid provoke 
debate among subsequent Jewish legal authorities as they read this ancient nar-
rative and apply its meanings to contemporary decisions regarding end-of-life 
issues. 
IV. THE HANDMAID: ACTIVE OR PASSIVE ASSISTANCE? 
Jewish interpreters have arrived at various legal conclusions from readings 
of this story, based upon their orientations as Halakhic Formalists or Covenan-
tal Ethicists. The Halakhic Formalist tradition forbids humans from taking par-
ticular actions that hasten the death of a patient. This position has been well-
summarized by Orthodox scholar J.D. Bleich, professor of Talmud at Yeshiva 
University. Bleich writes (in reference to the Karen Ann Quinlan case), “[t]he 
quality of life which is thus preserved is never a factor to be taken into consid-
eration . . . . [N]ever is [man] called upon to determine if life is worth living—
this is a question over which God remains the sole arbiter.”30 
                                                        
27  See DINA STEIN, TEXTUAL MIRRORS: REFLEXIVITY, MIDRASH AND THE RABBINIC SELF 175 
n.49 (2012). 
28  See Leonard Kravitz, Euthanasia, in DEATH AND EUTHANASIA IN JEWISH LAW: ESSAYS 
AND RESPONSA 11, 15 (Walter Jacob & Moshe Zemer eds., 1995). 
29  See id. at 17. 
30  See J. David Bleich, The Quinlan Case: A Jewish Perspective, in JEWISH BIOETHICS 285, 
293 (Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979). 
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For Bleich and certain other Halakhic Formalists, the belief that God is the 
master of life and death is a bedrock principle in their decisionmaking. Another 
principle that is operative in this discussion is piqu’aۊ nefesh: meaning that the 
saving of a human life overrides all other legal considerations.31 Based on these 
tenets, halakhah states: 
One may not hasten death, even that of a patient who is suffering greatly and for 
whom there is no hope of a cure, even if the patient ask that this be done. To 
shorten the life of a person, even a life of agony and suffering, is forbidden . . . . 
[I]t is equivalent to murder and is punishable accordingly.32 
What, then, to make of the prayers and action of the Handmaid? Analogi-
cally, prayer is the life support system for Judah ha-Nasi. When the Handmaid 
hurls the vessel and interrupts the prayers of the rabbis, the mechanism for pro-
longing his life is disconnected and, effectively, the handmaid hastens Rabbi’s 
death. As we noted above, the Talmud does not censure the Handmaid for her 
actions, even though it would seem that she contravened halakhah. How then, 
do Halakhic Formalists resolve this seeming contradiction? As we stated above, 
resolutions to this dilemma often cross Jewish denominational lines. 
A. Orthodox 
The Orthodox reading of this story is that the Handmaid’s actions are not 
directly correlated to Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi’s death. Bleich writes in regard to 
the Handmaid’s prayer, “[a]lthough man must persist in his effort to prolong 
life, he may, nevertheless, express human needs and concerns through the me-
dium of prayer.”33 In regard to her throwing of the vessel, Orthodox legal au-
thorities find sanction for her action through the following statement of the six-
teenth Century legal scholar Rabbi Moses Isserles (1520–72): 
It is forbidden to do anything to hasten the death of one who is in a dying condi-
tion. . . . If, however, there is something that causes a delay in the exit of the 
soul, as, for example, if near to this house there is a sound of pounding as one 
who is chopping wood, or there is salt on his tongue, and these delay the soul’s 
leaving the body, it is permitted to remove these because there is no direct act 
involved here, only the removal of an obstacle.34 
According to this halakhic ruling, the Handmaid’s action is like the remov-
al of an obstacle, like salt or any other impediment. In our story, the prayer of 
Rabbi’s disciples is the obstacle to his death; the Handmaid’s throwing of the 
vessel removes this obstacle and allows Rabbi to die. 
                                                        
31  See BT Yoma 85b. 
32  ABRAHAM S. ABRAHAM, THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO MEDICAL HALACHAH 177 (1990). 
33  J. David Bleich, Karen Ann Quinlan: A Torah Perspective, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH 
ETHICS 296, 302 (M. M. Kellner ed., 1978). 
34  ELLIOT N. DORFF, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: A JEWISH APPROACH TO MODERN 
MEDICAL ETHICS 199 (1998). 
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B. Conservative 
Conservative Jewish legal reading is equally fierce in its opposition to eu-
thanasia but utilizes Isserles’ ruling to make a further distinction between pa-
tient care and Physician-Assisted Death. “[I]n certain circumstances and under 
certain considerations[,] it may be permitted to withhold and withdraw a life-
sustaining treatment”35 in order to alleviate the pain of the patient. 
Conservative Judaism occupies a middle ground between the Orthodox and 
Reform movements. “Torah and Talmud are regarded as both divine in origin, 
but significantly shaped” by historical development and human transmission36. 
However, the Conservative movement stipulates that its Committee on Jewish 
Law and Standards (“CJLS”) of the Rabbinical Assembly decides upon hala-
khic questions. Thus, the arbiter of Jewish law is neither an individual halakhic 
authority as the Orthodox dictate, nor is it, as Reform Judaism holds, an in-
formed individual. Rather, it is a committee of recognized halakhic scholars 
within the Conservative movement that renders a legal judgment. 
C. Reform 
We have already indicated that the use of Halakhic Formalism, as an inter-
pretive method, transcends denominations. As with the Conservative move-
ment, Reform Judaism also has its own Responsa Committee that employs Ha-
lakhic Formalism to interpret Talmudic texts in order to render moral guidance 
for contemporary issues. However, the Committee’s rulings, in accordance with 
Reform ideology, are not binding.37 BT Ketubot 104a is interpreted in the Cen-
tral Conference of American Rabbis’ responsum entitled On the Treatment of 
the Terminally Ill.38 The responsum asserts that there is a moral difference be-
tween taking action to hasten a person’s death and withdrawing treatment so as 
to allow death to occur. The writers of the responsum conclude that the death of 
Rabbi Judah was not a result of action, but rather, of inaction.39 It was not, in 
their opinion, the Handmaid’s prayer for his death that caused him to die, but 
rather, the cessation of prayer by the surrounding rabbis that hastened Rabbi 
Judah’s death.40 The cessation, as previously discussed, was caused by the shat-
tering of the vessel dropped from the roof. BT Ketubot 104a does not, then, 
provide guidance for euthanasia, but instead, the writers of the responsum con-
clude, the narrative gives license for the withholding and withdrawing of life-
                                                        
35  Goedele Baeke et al., ‘There Is a Time to Be Born and a Time to Die’ (Ecclesiastes 3:2a): 
Jewish Perspectives on Euthanasia, 50 J. RELIGION & HEALTH 778, 786 (2011). 
36  See id. at 782. 
37  See Reform Responsa, CENT. CONF. AM. RABBIS, https://ccarnet.org/rabbis-speak 
/reform-responsa/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
38  See TESHUVOT FOR THE NINETIES: REFORM JUDAISM’S ANSWERS FOR TODAY’S DILEMMAS 
337–63 (W. Gunther Plaut & Mark Washofsky eds., 1997). 
39  See id. 
40  Id. 
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sustaining treatment: in the story, the Rabbis’ prayers represent life support; the 
shattering of the vessel is analogous to the withdrawal of such a system. As the 
Responsa Committee wrote, “[t]he Maidservant did not kill rabbi but rather re-
moved an inappropriate impediment to his death.”41 
D. Leonard Kravitz: An Alternative Reform Position 
Leonard Kravitz of Hebrew Union College Jewish Institute of Religion, the 
Reform Jewish Seminary, offers a different and nuanced reading of our story 
from those of his Orthodox, Conservative, and even Reform colleagues. In his 
article, Euthanasia, Kravitz employs both interpretive methods: Halakhic For-
malism and Covenantal Ethics. Whereas most Halakhic Formalists interpret the 
Handmaid’s actions as the removal of an obstacle to death—a passive action 
that didn’t hasten Judah’s death—Kravitz asserts that the Handmaid’s engage-
ment with Rabbi’s predicament is active: “[S]he interfered with Rabbi’s life 
support system. She acted; he died. . . . [H]er act precipitated his death.”42 
Importantly, for Kravitz and for other medical ethicists, there is no ethical 
difference between active and passive forms of Euthanasia. For instance, the 
bioethicist James Rachel argues that: “[T]here is really no moral difference be-
tween the two, considered in themselves (there may be important moral differ-
ences in some cases in their consequences, but . . . these difference may make 
active euthanasia, and not passive euthanasia, the morally preferable option).”43 
As a result of his reading of the story emphasizing the handmaid’s “active” ac-
tions, Kravitz concludes that “the notion that Judaism has always and every-
where been opposed to euthanasia simply cannot be maintained.”44 Kravitz bol-
sters his position on euthanasia by reinterpreting Isserles (gloss, 339) as an 
illustration of active euthanasia.45 As Kravitz states: “[O]ne cannot truly call 
the ‘removal of the impediment’ a passive action . . . one must reach into the 
patient’s mouth to remove the salt. There is certainly an ‘act involved’!”46 
Kravitz’s argument is that the Handmaid directly participates in the death of 
Rabbi Judah. Hers is an action done and not an action refrained from being 
done.47 
Thus far we have reviewed how Kravitz re-reads, as Ellenson states, “the 
rich literature of rabbinic Judaism in order to extrapolate principles and norms 
that would yield [us] authentic Jewish prescriptions on specific issues.”48 Al-
though Kravitz’s conclusions are unorthodox, in both senses of the word, his 
                                                        
41  Id. at 358. 
42  See Kravitz, supra note 28, at 16. 
43  See James Rachel, Active and Passive Euthanasia, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
BIOETHICS 313, 313–16 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 1982). 
44  Kravitz, supra note 28, at 17. 
45  See id. at 18. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. at 19. 
48  See Ellenson, supra note 2, at 130. 
1490 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1479 
methodology is part and parcel of classic halakhic debate. Kravitz employs Ha-
lakhic Formalism to dissect the meaning of classical Jewish legal texts. How-
ever, he ultimately finds this methodology insufficient for guidance in the con-
temporary world because Halakhic Formalism in relation to end-of-life issues 
can result in conflicting readings and can render the caretaker incapable of ac-
tion. We might do nothing to alleviate the suffering of a patient. 
To overcome this passivity, Kravitz employs the methodology of Covenan-
tal Ethics in order to respond to the contemporary issues of Physician-Assisted 
Death. Kravitz emphasizes autonomy in decisionmaking. As he writes: “For us 
as Liberal Jews, texts of the past have votes but not vetoes.” Thus, each of us 
functions as an authority for our own decisionmaking. Kravitz goes further to 
couple autonomy with compassion. Kravitz seizes on Lev. 19:18: v’ahavta 
l’reicha camocha—you shall love your neighbor as yourself—as the ethical ba-
sis for an individual, or if he is not sentient, for his family and doctors, to make 
not only ethical, but also merciful, end-of-life decisions. For him, it is “ethical 
and ‘Jewish’ to limit pain for that person whose life is coming to an end.”49 In 
sum, Kravitz’s examination of the issues surrounding end-of-life decisionmak-
ing illustrates how Covenantal Ethics aids us in responding to advances in med-
ical technology and patient care. To us as pulpit rabbis, we see in this interpre-
tative process a parallel to Subrin’s perspective that equity/discretion “grew 
interstitially, to fill in the gaps of substantive common law.” Similarly, Cove-
nantal Ethics and Halakhic Formalism complement each other as we struggle to 
make ethical decisions in the contemporary world. 
CONCLUSION: THE HANDMAID AS COVENANTAL ETHICIST 
When confronted by the issues surrounding the Massachusetts Death with 
Dignity Ballot initiative, we found the story of Rabbi’s Handmaid influential in 
formulating our own ethical conclusions. Clearly, the Handmaid is not an hala-
khic decisionmaker, but she is caring for the foremost halakhic authority in 
Rabbinic literature who is confronting his own death. As the story implies, 
Rabbi Judah is being sustained by the continuous prayers of his disciples, 
which function as (using contemporary language) a life-support system. The 
Handmaid watching from above has the most expansive view of this complex, 
unfolding situation. As Dina Stein writes, 
Standing on the roof, the maid witnesses his agony at having to remove his tefil-
lin and put them on again each time he goes to the toilet. The maidservant, un-
like the rabbis, sees him in moments of physical intimacy. . . . On the roof, posi-
tioned between heaven and earth, she perceives the broader picture . . . . She 
realizes that her master ought to die . . . . She brings the rabbis’ discourse to a 
halt . . . not by words but by the violent act of breaking the jug.50 
                                                        
49  See Kravitz, supra note 28, at 22. 
50  See STEIN, supra note 27, at 113–14. 
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This Talmudic story about a Handmaid’s action influences how we func-
tion in our lives when confronting contemporary ethical issues: she is a role 
model embedded in an ancient narrative. To us, the Handmaid is a Covenantal 
Ethicist. Stirred by his suffering, she makes an autonomous decision to end 
Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi’s life. She enacts the ethical principle: v’ahavta 
l’re’eicha, camocha—you shall love your neighbor as yourself.51 
Through the decades we have been fortunate to have Stephen Subrin em-
bedded in our lives as both a friend and fellow student of the Jewish tradition. 
In the course of reviewing his writings and in developing this paper, we are 
grateful that he, too, consistently reveals himself as a Covenantal Ethicist. 
 
  
                                                        
51  See Leviticus 19:18. 
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